WeWork and the $39 Billion Cost of Mistaking Charisma for Competence

Why every investor and board member who met Adam Neumann walked away impressed - and why that was exactly the problem.

In 2017, Masayoshi Son, CEO of SoftBank and one of the most experienced technology investors alive, committed $4.4 billion to WeWork after spending just 12 minutes with Adam Neumann. Twelve minutes. For context, the average job interview lasts 40 minutes. A standard psychometric assessment takes longer than that to complete.

Son was not naive. He built SoftBank into a $100 billion empire and made early bets on Alibaba and Yahoo Japan. But Neumann's energy, vision, and conviction were so compelling that one of the world's sharpest investors bypassed every due diligence instinct he had spent decades developing.

This is the part that should trouble every executive who has ever sat across from a candidate and thought: "This person is extraordinary."

Because Adam Neumann was extraordinary. That was never the question. The question nobody asked was: extraordinary for what, exactly?

The numbers behind the collapse

WeWork's trajectory is well-documented, but the specific figures still shock. At its peak in January 2019, the company was valued at $47 billion, making it the most valuable private startup in America. By the time the S-1 filing hit in August 2019, investors discovered that behind the valuation sat $1.9 billion in losses on $1.8 billion in revenue. The company was burning more money than it earned.

But the financial mismanagement was only part of the story. What the S-1 revealed was a pattern of behavior that any rigorous people-assessment process should have flagged years earlier.

Neumann trademarked the word "We" personally, then sold it back to his own company for $5.9 million. He purchased buildings through personal entities and leased them to WeWork. He held 20-to-1 supervoting shares that made the board functionally powerless. He designated his wife, Rebekah, to choose his successor if he became incapacitated. He invented a financial metric called "Community Adjusted EBITDA" that stripped out almost every real expense.

The IPO was pulled. The valuation collapsed from $47 billion to roughly $8 billion. Neumann was forced out with a $1.7 billion exit package. WeWork filed for bankruptcy in November 2023 carrying $19 billion in liabilities.

The uncomfortable question for anyone who hires people

Here is what makes the WeWork case relevant far beyond Silicon Valley: if you had run Adam Neumann through a standard psychometric battery in 2015, a Hogan Leadership Forecast, an SHL Occupational Personality Questionnaire, or a Big Five inventory, what would the results have told you?

They would have told you he was an exceptional leadership candidate.

High extraversion. High openness to experience. Strong ambition. Visionary thinking. Charismatic communication. Comfort with risk. Every one of these is coded as a positive leadership indicator in traditional trait-based assessment. The personality profile was never wrong. Neumann genuinely possessed those traits. The problem is that those same traits, in a specific set of conditions, unlimited capital, minimal board oversight, and weak accountability structures, became the exact mechanisms of destruction.

Research on narcissistic leadership confirms this pattern. There is an inverted-U relationship between narcissism and leadership effectiveness: moderate levels correlate with strong performance, but the curve tips into destruction at higher levels. Traditional personality assessments cannot reliably distinguish where a candidate sits on that curve, because the tools were designed to measure traits, not to test how those traits behave under specific pressures.

The test that was never administered

Consider what would have happened if, instead of measuring who Neumann was, someone had tested how he would respond to the specific pressures of the role he was being entrusted with.

Imagine a structured scenario: "You have just received a $4.4 billion investment. Your company is pre-profit and expanding into 30 countries simultaneously. Walk me through how you allocate this capital, who has oversight, and what guardrails you put in place."

Or another: "Your board proposes appointing an independent compensation committee and reducing your voting power to align with industry governance standards. What is your response?"

Or this one: "You discover an opportunity to personally profit from a transaction involving the company. It is technically legal but will face scrutiny. How do you handle it?"

These are not abstract personality questions. They are simulations of the exact conditions that destroyed $39 billion in value. And Neumann's actual behavior, inventing metrics, stacking the board, and self-dealing, was his response to these situations. It was just never elicited in a structured way before the damage was done.

The personality traits were never wrong. The context was always missing.

Why this keeps happening

WeWork is dramatic, but it is not unusual. Research consistently shows that 40 to 60 percent of senior executives fail within 18 months of being hired or promoted. A survey of chief human resource officers found that 45 percent estimated the cost of a failed external executive hire at $2 to $5 million, with another 15 percent putting it above $5 million. Challenger, Gray & Christmas reported a record 2,221 CEO departures in 2024, the highest since tracking began in 2002.

The pattern is the same each time. Boards assess candidates on who they are, their traits, credentials, track record, and interview presence, rather than testing how they would respond to the specific pressures, politics, and constraints of the role they are being given.

A landmark 2022 meta-analysis by Sackett, Zhang, Berry, and Lievens found that the validity of personality tests for predicting job performance had been systematically overestimated for decades. The best personality predictor, Conscientiousness, explains roughly 3.6 percent of the variance in actual job performance. That means 96.4 percent of what determines whether someone succeeds or fails in a role is not captured by their personality profile.

This does not mean personality is irrelevant. It means personality alone is radically insufficient, especially at the senior level, where the gap between trait-level assessment and role-specific situational pressures is widest.

What this means for anyone making people decisions

The lesson from WeWork is not that charismatic leaders are dangerous. It is that charisma, like every other trait, is neither good nor bad in the abstract. It is good or bad in context. A leader with Neumann's energy and conviction in a role with strong governance, clear financial accountability, and an experienced board might have built something remarkable. The same leader, with the same traits, in a role with none of those constraints, built a catastrophe.

The question that matters is not "What kind of person is this?" It is: "Given the specific pressures of this role, the politics, the constraints, the pace, and the stakeholders, how will this person respond when those pressures arrive?"

That is a fundamentally different question. And it requires a fundamentally different kind of assessment to answer.

Further Reading

The Money Men Who Enabled Adam Neumann and the WeWork Debacle

Private Equity Insights / Wall Street Journal

This analysis is part of our ongoing research into defensible people decisions. PERSONA is the assessment platform we built from six years of this research to help organizations test how people respond to the specific pressures of a role, not label them with fixed traits.